


THE DIFFICULTY OF EFFECTIVELY BLOCKADING GERMANY



BLOCKADE MAP OF GERMANY.

German Map Showing the Ease With Which Food Supplies May Be Obtained Through Neutral Ports

By PROF. LAWRENCE MARXIN
of the University of Wisconsin.

MANY Americans have wondered why it was necessary to blockade the seaports of a neutral country like Holland or Denmark in order to keep foodstuffs from reaching Germany. The map on this page helps to make this clear. It also shows in wonderful system of inland waterways in

Germany that makes it easy to get food through neutral ports.

Hamburg, the great port in the

northwest of Germany at the mouth of the river Elbe, has been cut off more and more since the beginning of the war. Now look at the sizes of the circles at the various towns on the map that Hamburg is not the only seaport that can efficiently deliver sea-borne goods to Germany.

The geographical positions of Belgium and Holland below in southwest Germany and the sea make their ports essentially German ports. In fact, it is said that before the war the

ports opposite Hamburg, Rotterdam

and Antwerp, as well as the other seaports, show respectively the tonnage and the value of the cargo that come into and go out of these ports in time of peace. The large triangles at Antwerp and Rotterdam are not determined solely by the domestic resources of these prosperous little countries, or by their colonial trade, but by the confluence of the great German Empire as well.

The circles at the towns are divided into sectors which indicate the relative amounts of traffic at these ports via sea, via rail and via inland waterways. Thus it is seen that while Berlin has a little more freight carried by rail than by river, Hamburg and Rotterdam have more goods carried by river and canal than by rail. The last two have more commerce by sea than by rail and by river together.

This brings us to the inland waterways. The widths of the lines drawn along the rivers show the amount of traffic and canal boat traffic. On this excellent German-made map the amounts of upstream and downstream shipping are separated.

Attention may be called to the broad

lines along the Rhine and the Elbe, and even to the south of Germany near Dresden in Saxony and Koensnicht in the industrial district of southeastern Silesia, close to Cracow. Note the canals which connect Germany and France and the canals that unite the Elbe with the Oder near Berlin, the latter with the Vistula near Bromberg and the Danube with the Elbe southeast of Frankfort-on-the-Main.

The transportation of grain, manufactured materials, &c., on the German waterways is steadily increasing. Nothing is more menacing to the independent existence of Holland and Belgium after the war than this growth of traffic on the German waterways, especially when considered in relation to the geographical situation of Rotterdam and Antwerp at the mouth of the great artery of German trade, the Rhine. Thus Holland is seen to be blocking Germany's waterways in time of peace.

This is due not only to the situation of Holland on the Rhine delta but also to the presence of Germany's great mining and industrial districts, much of the downstream traffic from the coal mining, textile manufacturing and steel and armament making towns in the greatest industrial district of

Germany, though it is larger than Indianapolis or St. Paul. Its commerce, however, is far greater than that of Hamburg or Berlin or Stein or Rotterdam or Antwerp. Situated at the junction of the Rhine and the little river Ruhr, it is the port of origin of much of the downstream traffic from the coal mining, textile manufacturing and steel and armament making towns in the greatest industrial district of Germany.

A canal and a canalized river lead from Duisburg along the Dutch frontier to the German port of Emden. But Emden's traffic inland and at sea is small. Do you suppose that Germany will increase it letting Rotterdam in time as a non-neutral port? Will they give up Antwerp in the end? The war, with all of the indirect and vital relations to the railways and inland waterways of Germany?

There are many more aspects to the geographical positions of Antwerp and Rotterdam, besides those involved in the present attempt of the Allies to starve out Germany by closing her ports and the great waterways of Holland.

ORGANIZATION OF "MINUTE MEN" IS URGED FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

By MAJOR JOHN H. PARKER
of the Eighth Infantry, U. S. A.

TODAY we meet such a crisis as Belgium had to face just August the United States is absolutely unprepared. The small regular army is scattered from Maine to Alaska, from Panama, and could not be concentrated. An improvised force would only invite destruction like that of Louvain or heavy indemnities like that imposed upon Brussels, without materially delaying the progress of a trained enemy.

England, Japan, or Germany could overwhelm all opposition before an effective force could be prepared to defend our country from national humiliation. Such a contingency may seem remote; but so did the conquest of Belgium, truly protected as a buffer state by a Harvard-trained army of so-called volunteers, seem remote July 31, 1914. August 15 Belgium was bleeding and prostrate, opposing an ineffectual resistance that only provoked the severity of the conqueror.

Will the people of the United States deliver themselves over to a genuine "militarism" by establishing an adequate standing army for war insurance, or will they follow the wise counsels of the founders of this Republic by providing for an adequate and adequately trained citizen soldier?

A body of "minute men" suitably trained for national defence, but not withdrawn from productive activities in time of peace nor dedicated to the military profession as a lifetime pursuit.

The moment our country sanctions the creation of a large standing army, one large enough for national security, it inoculates the body politic with the virus of a disease which history

shows to be fatal to republican institutions, let us not be deceived. If we do this thing let it be done intelligently, knowing what its ultimate effects will be.

No doubt our country is the peculiar school of Providence, but no revolution has been consummated as that of 1776 except by the operation of those natural laws of growth and decay which have been revealed in the life cycles of other nations. The creation of such a force would be "militarism" indeed, for not less than half a million soldiers would be adequate, and the sage got on of such a body would be the creation of a caste, a military caste, whose wages would have to compete with the standards of civil occupations in order to provide for national defence.

There is a better way, and this is the way:

Reorganize the regular army as the schoolmaster of national defence, and send to it for instruction an adequate number of those who will voluntarily undertake to hold themselves liable, for a limited time, to emergency posts, not for aggression against any neighbor, but to defend their own homes and country, if necessary against hostile aggression from without.

These minute men could then be furloughed for three years. The military status of furlough carries with it the obligation to respond at once to military orders. It is the minute man status. These men would leave their arms, uniforms and equipment packed, ready for instant use.

A regiment of the regular army could take 125 minute men per company, 4,750 minute men for its entire organization, and could train them satisfactorily in ten months.

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To concentrate them for immediate service would not take twenty-four hours.

Each regiment would train 5,250 of these minute men in three years, and would have a new class of 1,750 under training during the fourth year. That is a total of 6,000 trained minute men for each regiment—a brigade of trained men at call in place of a regiment.

This would mean an army of

350,000 trained minute men, in addition to the 150,000 National Guards, or a total of half a million trained and equipped and organized soldiers ready to respond at a moment's notice.

These brigades of minute men could be trained right at the big military posts already in existence in the United States. Every facility is already there, even the expert instructors and the dormitories and the kitchens for cooking the food. These posts are geographically distributed in a convenient manner for accessibility and to reduce the cost of traveling. They could be utilized instead of abandoned.

The officers for these brigades of minute men are already training them for sixty years in a hundred military colleges under regular officers. The graduates of these military schools would make the very best possible material for company officers of minute men, and would be easier to accept commissions as such.

The fact that they have not only volunteered to take military training but have willingly paid for it is sufficient evidence of this point.

The officers of the regular army

would furnish brigade commander and staff, three regimental commanders and staffs, nine battalion commanders and staffs; the companies of minute men would be officered by graduates of military colleges, trained under the direction of the United States Government.

All the directive offices of the

army would be filled by the most highly trained officers; all the others by the best and best trained material in the country; and all would be arranged in time of peace, without con-

fusion, without a shadow of political influence.

Still better, adopting the "college encampment" idea, calling all these minute men and their officers once a year to a two weeks encampment for instruction, every officer would be familiar in time of peace with the very men he would command in time of war—would be trained in all the preliminary business that would precede encounter with the enemy.

This system could be initiated by a reduction of "overhead" charges in the factory. We do not need 150 men in a company in the regular army for this purpose. Most of those men are recruits, anyway. Twenty-five picked men a company as instructors, cooks, mechanics, &c., with the regular officers, would be plenty.

More than that would be simply an "overhead" charge without return; an unproductive element of the organization.

We now have about seventy-five men a company. The fifty men could be immediately furloughed as the first class of minute men, and the rest put to work in the great factory of national defence. This reduction would be a saving, to start with, of over \$10,000,000 a year. Instead of a heavy increase of the regular army, we could start with a heavy reduction—reduction to a working force that could be most economically utilized to produce the legitimate output of this plant-trained citizen soldiery.

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